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A Note on the Arrow-Lind Theorem
By L. P. FoLDES AND R. REES*
Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lind have recently
proved a theorem on risky public projects, stat-
ing that under certain conditions the social cost
of the risk tends to zero as the population tends
to infinity, so that projects can be evaluated on
the basis of expected net benefit alone. The pres-
ent note gives an alternative formulation and a
short new proof of the theorem, and uses these
to examine the role of certain assumptions con-
cerning the operation of the public sector which
in the original were left implicit or received
inadequate attention. Some general critical
comments on the applicability of the theorem
are also offered.
The conditions stated by Arrow and Lind as
sufficient for the validity of their result include
the following: (i) the government initially ap-
propriates all benefits and pays all costs, dis-
tributing the net returns subsequently "through
changes in the level of taxes" (p. 371); (ii) the
net returns are statistically independent of each
person's disposable income in the absence of
the project; and (iii) each person's share of the
net returns tends to zero as the number n of
persons tends to infinity. The result is proved
formally only for the case where "all taxpayers
[are] identical in that they [have] the same
utility function, their incomes [are] represented
by identically distributed variables, and they
[are] subject to the same tax rates"; but the
authors state that " . . .the basic theorem still
holds, provided that as n becomes larger the
share of the public investment borne by any in-
dividual becomes arbitrarily smaller" (p. 373).
This theorem, if generally applicable, would
have important practical consequences. It would
tend to support an extension of public sector
investment by justifying the use of a riskless
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discount rate applied to expected returns. It
would also argue in favor of state participation
in private investments where this allows risks to
be spread over a larger number of persons. A
review of the explicit assumptions alone must
cast doubt on the general validity of such appli-
cations. The assumption of independence is un-
realistic for many investments, for example in
infrastructure and "basic" industries whose
returns are highly correlated with national
income. The assumption that the share of the
net benefits of an investment accruing to any
person becomes negligible as population tends
to infinity is unacceptable in at least three cases:
for public goods, where the benefit is not
"shared" but increases with the population; for
projects whose scale must be adjusted roughly
in proportion to the size of population (such as
the construction of a grid system of electricity
distribution); and for projects whose benefits
accrue wholly or in part to a section of the
population which is "small" in the sense of the
theorem. The last reservation applies not merely
to those projects which are specifically designed
to benefit only a small part of the population,
but also to those special benefits and costs from
any project which happen to accrue unavoidably
to limited groups. Arrow and Lind avoid this
problem in their formal discussion by assuming
that the government taxes all benefits and
compensates all losses, although they acknowl-
edge that this is unrealistic.
Be that as it may, the present note accepts the
Arrow-Lind approach more or less on its own
terms, and considers more fully the role of cer-
tain implicit assumptions concerning the fiscal
system and public expenditure. Specifically, it
will be recalled that Arrow and Lind work with
only two random variables, the disposable in-
come of a typical individual and the income
from distribution of project retums by the gov-
ernment. Although the latter is referred to in-
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formally as representing "changes in the level
of taxes," the actual model makes no mention
of ordinary taxes or government spending. Pro-
ject returns are simply appropriated by govern-
ment, presumably through lump sum compen-
sating taxes, and then distributed to taxpayers
by way of a "100 percent dividend," i.e., by
lump sum transfers in fixed proportions absorb-
ing the whole of the return. Suppose that this
method of distribution were replaced by a more
realistic system, for example a variation in the
rate of a proportional income tax (gross incomes
being regarded as random variables unaffected
by the rate of tax). It can be shown that this
change would make no essential difference in
the Arrow-Lind model as it stands because
individuals are statistically identical, so that in
terms ofexpected utility each would gain on the
swings what he lost on the roundabouts. When
this assumption is abandoned, the change will
benefit some taxpayers and hurt others. More
significantly, a person's disposable income
without the project and the effect of the project
on that income may become dependent random
variables even though the gross income and the
total return on the project are independent.' Such
dependence would, of course, vitiate application
of the Arrow-Lind theorem. The point at issue
here is not only that the repercussions of the
project revenue through the system of taxation
may create statistical dependence which would
not otherwise have existed, but also that the
Arrow-Lind assumption of independence owes
some of its apparent appeal to the "unneces-
sary" condition that people are identical. The
analysis can indeed be extended if this con-
dition is discarded, but the substantive content
of the assumption of independence must be
considerably strengthened. Further ramifica-
tions arise if allowance is made (a) for the
possibility of using project returns to finance
changes in public expenditure as well as in rates
'It should be noted that the impact ofthe system of public
finance may well be to create negative correlation between
project benefits and net disposable incomes, so that by
ignoring this influence one may understate the value of
public projects to a community of risk averters.
of taxation; (b) for the necessity to treat expendi-
ture or tax rates or both as random variables if
the government is to balance its budget; (c) for
the possibility that individuals obtain differential
benefits from public spending; and (d) for the
possibility that individuals derive some direct
benefits from projects which are not offset by
lump sum taxes, and that these benefits or the
public "dividends" or both are subjected to
ordinary income taxes.
The model considered below incorporates
these features. The general conclusion is that the
conditions for the validity of the Arrow-Lind
theorem are considerably more stringent than is
apparent from the original exposition, and that
the circumstances in which the conclusions of
the theorem apply are extremely restricted.
L An Alternative Proof
of the Arrow-Lind Theorem
Turning now to a mathematical discussion,
we begin with a formulation which follows Ar-
row and Lind's "implicit" treatment of the
public sector but does not assume that persons
are identical or that project benefits are initially
appropriated by the state. A proof of the main
theorem is given which is in some respects sim-
pler and more general than the original one,
though it does require that marginal utility be
continuous. Structural assumptions about the
public sector are then introduced and some of
their implications noted.
The economy contains n persons i = 1,
. . . , « , where n may take values no, «o + 1,
. . starting with some «o- Several random
variables will be defined, all of which are sup-
posed to have as domain the same probability
space; an elementary event w corresponds to a
state of nature influencing the economy. All ran-
dom variables are assumed to be integrable, i.e.,
to have finite expectations. The random variable
Xi = JC((n) represents Ts Income in the absence
of a certain public project when population is
n, while Xi{n) + ri(n) represents his income if
the project Is introduced. These incomes are
defined after all taxes, subsidies, and other ef-
fects of government are taken into account, so
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that r, is the total impact of the project upon fs
income, including repercussions through the
public sector.^
One natural interpretation of this setup
(though not the only one) is to regard ?",(«) as
i's share of the random variable Z(n) repre-
senting total returns to the project, whether ob-
tained directly or through changes in taxation;
in this case Z = SfTj, and all r,- have the same
sign as Z. An even more special case would be
to assume that all xi are identically distributed
and invariant to n while ri{n) = Z{n)/n for
each /.
Suppose now that the preferences of / among
risky incomes are defined by the expected values
£uj(.) of his utility function, which is assumed
to be defined and finite on the real line, strictly
increasing, continuously differentiable, and
such that Eui{xi) and Eui{xi + TJ) are finite for
each n (possibly because MJ is bounded). For
given n, i is made better off by the project if
and only if.
(I) ^ E{uiixi + Ti) - Ui
Applying the mean value theorem for deriva-
tives (separately for each elementary event <w)
to the expression under the expectation sign,
the condition becomes
where for each <y the value 0i («) lies in [0, 1].^
On multiplying by n, (2) becomes
(3) 0 <
Now assume that for a given i as n —» oo,
(a) there are integrable limiting random
variables /?,- and x,-, independent of one another,
such that nnin) -^ Rt and Xi(n) -* Xt
with probability one; and
'^ In allowing xi as well as r,- to vary with «, we depart
from Arrow and Lind's treatment. This change is neces-
sary because the assumption that income after taxes, etc. is
invariant to population would impose too many implicit
restrictions on the working of the public sector.
^Since xi and r,- are random variables, i.e., measurable
functions of events, the same is evidently true of
"iUt + rt) - Uj{xi) and hence of riu',(xi + d,r,). It can
also be shown that Xi + 0,^; and 6, are random variables,
but this fact does not seem to be required.
(b) passage to the limit under the expecta-
tion sign on the right-hand side of (3) is per-
missible.'*
For example, (a) obviously holds in the spe-
cial case mentioned above where rj(n) =
Z(n)/n. On the other hand (a) is not satisfied if
/-j represents i's untaxed benefit from a pure
public good, since then r,- does not vary with n
and \nri\ -^ oo unless r; = 0.
The assumptions are used as follows. It is
inferred from (a) that riin) —» 0 with prob-
ability one, hence that ulixi + diri) -»
u'i(xi) since MJ is continuous. Then (a) further
shows that the expression under the expectation
sign in (3) tends to /?,«• (x,), so that by virtue of
(b) the expectation itself tends to £{/?(«,'(ij)}.
This in turn equals ERiEu'i(xi) because ^, and
Xi, henceRj and MKJCJ). ^re independent. Thus,
as n -^ 00, the condition (3) for an increase
in expected utility becomes
or simply 0 s ERt since w,' > 0. To sum up,
when n is "large," i is made better off by the
project if, and only if, the expected change in his
income is positive. If we assume with Arrow
and Lind that Ri-Z (invariant to n) for every
(', then everyone is made better off, if and only
if the total expected return from the project is
positive. Clearly this latter result could be ob-
tained from a weaker assumption, for example
that lim EZ{n) exists and that each ERi has the
same sign as this limit.^
''Various conditions can be invoked to justify this oper-
ation. For example, if «, is a bounded function of income
and the random variables nriin) are uniformly bounded,
the result follows from the Dominated Convergence
Theorem. Weaker assumptions may suffice in particular
cases. Incidentally, some condition of this kind is needed
to justify the passage to the limit in Arrow and Lind's
equation (21).
^The discussion in the text derives conditions in which
a public project increases the welfare of one person. Simi-
lar methods can clearly be used to obtain conditions for an
increase in the value of a social welfare function of the form
where ai(n) > 0 and ^^ "i(n) = I fw each n
1 = 1
. VOL. 67 NO. 2 FOLDES AND REES: ARROW-LIND THEOREM 191
II. Relevance of the Fiscal System
We now specify the model more explicitly in
order to answer some of the questions raised in
the introduction; various specifications could
be chosen, but the discussion which follows is
illustrative of the general results. For each n,
let the random variable G^(n) denote govern-
ment expenditure in the absence of the project,
and G'(n) the corresponding variable if the
project is undertaken. (Distributions of project
benefits are excluded from G', although the
line between these payments and general trans-
fers may have to be drawn arbitrarily.) The value
of the benefits (free of tax) which / derives from
expenditure G(n) is assumed to have the form
Ci{n)G(n), where for each n the c,- are nonnega-
tive constants. If all expenditure is devoted to
pure public goods, all constants equal unity;
whereas they sum to unity if the government
distributes purely private goods. Next, let X,(«)
be ("s random income before taxes from pri-
vate sources; /"(«) the proportional random rate
of tax payable on this income in the absence of
the project; and /'(n) the corresponding rate if
the project is undertaken. We write X(n) =
2,.Y,(M) for total gross income from private
sources: aj(n) = X,(n)/X(n) for /'s share of
this total. For simplicity we ignore borrowing
and lending, and assume that personal and gov-
ernment budgets balance. In the absence of the
project, the budget identities are
(5) .ti = ( l - f« )A: i + CiG«
(6) G° = t^X
These are identities between random vari-
ables, holding for /I = «o, "0 + 1. . . . Note that
since X is random, G" or r" or both must be
random.
Now let the random variable Z{n) denote total
net benefit from the project, Zi{n) the net bene-
fit accruing to / (whether directly or through
distributions by government), and Za^n) =
Z — 2j2j the portion retained by the government
for the finance of its expenditure. In general the
variables z, need not all have the same sign as
Z, but ZG is assumed to have this sign and not to
exceed Z in absolute value. The Zi(n) are sup-
posed to be subject to a random proportional tax
rate T(n), where 0 < T(n) < 1. Then the budget
identities for persons and government when the
project is undertaken have the form
(7)
(8) G' =
An expression for r^  can now be obtained
from (5) and (7); then (6) and (8) can be used to
eliminate either t" — t^ or G" — G', yielding
respectively.
•¥ {\ - T)ZG'\
( 9 ) r , = ( Q -
(10)
For brevity we now consider two special cases
of the model.
A. Government Expenditure Unaffected
by the Project
In this case G'(/i) = G°(n) for each n, and
so (9) reduces to
(11) r, = {I - T)zi + atlrZ + {I - T)ZG]
while (5) and (6) together with a,- = Xi/X yield
(12) Xi
In order to apply condition (a) of our proof of
the Arrow-Lind Theorem to the values of nr,-
and xi appearing in (11) and (12), it is necessary
to make assumptions about the limits of several
variables as « -^ oo.
Eirst, to ensure that nri{n) converges to some
Ri, it is enough by (11) to assume that nzi, noi,
T, Z, and ZG converge (with probability one,
to integrable limiting variables). Note that the
convergence of nai = nXi/X implies that the
income share a^  of a given individual tends to
zero; this holds, for example, in the special case
where Xi = X/n. Note also that the case of pure
public goods is ruled out by the assumptions
about the project variables Z and nzt.
Secondly, to ensure that Xi(n) converges to
some Xi, it is enough by (12) to assume that
192 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 1977
X/n, G"/n, and «Cj (as well as nat) converge.
In other words, there must be limits with finite
expectations of private sector income and gov-
ernment expenditure per head, and of the prod-
uct of population with /"s benefit per dollar of
public expenditure; the first two conditions
seem reasonable, while the last may be subject
to reservations if the level of spending on public
goods is maintained when the population is
large.
Thirdly, the limiting variables Ri and Xi have
to be independent; this presents difficulties since
by (11) and (12) the term nai is common to nri
and Xi. To rule out dependence, it is enough to
adopt one of the following assumptions:
(i) That lim nOj is degenerate (constant across
states); this appears too special a condition to
be acceptable.
(ii) That lim (X - G'*)/n = 0; this would be
satisfied if G"/X -* 1 with X/n bounded,
or if X/n -^ 0. The former case implies a
tax rate of ?" = G"/X rising to 100 percent as
population increases, which is unreasonable.
The latter case, that gross private income per
head tends to zero, could well occur for Mal-
thusian reasons; even so, applications of the
theorem must be made for finite populations,
and it is unlikely that {X-G'')/n would in
practice be close enough to zero,
(iii) That hm [TZ -I- (1 - TZG] = 0; this holds
in general only if lim T = lim ZG = 0 (leaving
aside the uninteresting case in which lim Z = 0).
This means that, in the limit, no tax is imposed
on project benefits, and no part of them is re-
tained by the government to finance expendi-
ture; in other words the benefits of the project
accrue in full to persons, without liability to tax.
The only one of these assumptions which has
real economic interest is that in (iii). If we adopt
it, we are accepting that the public project in
question has no fiscal repercussions, a condition
which in many practical cases would not be
satisfied. For example, an irrigation project
would generate additional incomes for farmers,
and these would be subject to tax. Again, the
returns from investment in British nationalized
industries are viewed as inflows to the public
sector, and are regarded for many purposes as
a source of finance in much the same way as
indirect taxation. Suppose that we accept the
assumption nevertheless; then (11) reduces to
r. = nzi, and it remains to postulate that
Ri = lim nZi is independent of the limits of
(X - G^)/n, CiG", and nai = nXj/X. Thus, in
the limit, project Income for each person to
whom the theorem is applied is to be independent
not only of the per capita difference between
gross private sector income and public expendi-
ture, but also of the person's benefit per unit of
public expenditure and of the ratio of private
sector income to the population average. While
there seems to be no theoretical relationship
among the variables which rules out such in-
dependence a priori, the stated condition is
clearly much more restrictive than the simple
requirement that the project return be indepen-
dent of each person's gross income from private
sources.
B. Tax Rates Unaffected by the Project
In this case / ' = /", so that
(13) ri = ( l - T ) z i - h c j [ T Z + ( l - T ) Z G ]
from (10), while (5) and (6) yield
(14) Xi = {nai)(X - t''X)/n + {nCi){t''X/n)
The analysis now proceeds along much the
same lines as under Section IIA, except that
government expenditure per head G^/n is re-
placed by tax revenue per head t'^X/n. Briefly,
to ensure the convergence of nri ^nd x, we as-
sume integrable limits for nzt, nai, T, Z, ZG ,
X/n, nci, and /"X/n. As regards the indepen-
dence of the limits, it is now nCi which appears
in both expressions, and we are led as before to
the unattractive assumption that lim T = lim
ZG = 0. It then remains to suppose that Ri =
lim nzi is independent of the limits of
( X - /''X)/n, Cit''X, and nai; thus public ex-
penditure per head is replaced by tax revenue
per head in the independence condition given
above.
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A striking feature of the various italicized
conditions in this section is that the aggregative
assumption of independence adopted by Arrow
and Lind can reasonably be expected to hold
only if similar assumptions are satisfied by each
of a number of sectoral variables. These as-
sumptions must, of course, hold separately for
each individual to whom the theorem is applied.
This not only represents a strengthening of
assumptions, but also makes it much more diffi-
cult to establish that the conditions under which
the theorem holds are met in any given situation.
III. Conclusions
Using a proof of the Arrow-Lind theorem
which makes the roles of the various assump-
tions more transparent, we have tried in this
note to bring out the implications of a more
realistic specification of the fiscal system in
which public sector investment is embedded.
Taxes and expenditure exist with or without
any one project, and the government must bal-
ance its budget in each state of the world. We
find that in this case the sufficient conditions
used in the proof of the theorem become a good
deal more restrictive. In particular, to ensure
independence between the impact of a project
on the individual's income and his marginal
utility across states of the world we have to as-
sume—leaving aside some unappealing special
cases—that the project income is free from
taxation and that none of it is retained to finance
public expenditure. The assumption of inde-
pendence between the project's return and pri-
vate incomes, which itself is open to question,
must be extended to a number of sectoral vari-
ables in a way for which there is no obvious
empirical justification. These results suggest
that there is still a need for an analysis of public
sector investment criteria under uncertainty,®
which will yield more general and robust results.
"The papers by Rees (1973, 1976) adopt more general
approaches to this problem.
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